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ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to account for the impact of statistical noise and exogenous regulatory and en-
vironmental factors on the efficiency of public transit systems in a DEA-based framework. To this end, we im-
plement a three-stage DEA-SFA mixed approach based on Fried et al. (2002) using a 1993-1999 panel of 42 Ital-
ian public transit companies. This allows us to decompose input-specific DEA inefficiency measures into three 
components: exogenous effects, pure managerial inefficiency, and statistical noise. First, the initial evaluation of 
producer performance is carried out using conventional variable returns to scale DEA (Banker et al., 1984). Sec-
ond, a SFA approach (Battese and Coelli, 1992) is used to regress single input slacks on subsidies regulation 
(cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts) and a set of environmental variables including network speed and user 
density. Finally, third stage re-runs DEA on inputs purged of both exogenous effects and statistical noise. Results 
are such that adjusting for the type of regulatory scheme, environmental conditions, and statistical noise increases 
average efficiency in the industry and reduces dispersion among firms. Furthermore, the implementation of fixed-
price subsidies is found to enhance efficiency in the usage of “drivers” and “materials and services” inputs. Such 
a result sheds some light on the determinants of input-specific efficiency differentials in the industry, improving 
the existing evidence on mean overall cost efficiency (e.g. Gagnepain e Ivaldi, 2002; Piacenza, 2006). As a policy 
implication, it is confirmed the relevance of regula tion aimed at replacing cost-plus subsidization mechanisms 
with high-powered incentive contracts as well as improving operating conditions of public transport networks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
his paper reconciles empirical contract 
theory applied to local public transport 
(LPT) industry with Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA)-based models incorporating 
policy and environmental effects and statistical 
noise. The main policy implication of our study 
is related to the assessment of the efficiency en-
hancing effect of “fixed-price” regulatory 
schemes as compared to “cost-plus” ones. 
Building upon previous literature on the topic 
dealing with the Italian case (Piacenza, 2006), 
the work is aimed at verifying the extent to 
which both regulation and other non-
discretionary factors affect input-by-input inef-
ficiency differentials in the industry. Further-
more, we pursue the analysis allowing for the 
presence of statistical noise, overcoming the 
limitation of DEA models due to their determi-
nistic nature. Such an aim is motivated by the 
fact that inputs employed by local public trans-
port suppliers can be rationalized at different ex-
tent. Hence, it is predictable that changes in 
regulation and/or environmental characteristics 
may induce higher slack reductions in the usage 
of more controllable inputs (e.g. labor) as com-
pared to less controllable ones (e.g. fuel).  
A crucial issue in the literature investigating 
the determinants of the production (or X-) inef-
ficiency in LPT systems is the role played by 
non-discretionary characteristics in affecting lo-
cal suppliers’ performance. Due to the high de-
gree of regulation, alternative subsidization 
mechanisms are indeed most likely to give rise, 
ceteris paribus, to inefficiency differentials 
across suppliers. Furthermore, it might well be 
the case of efficiency gaps induced by different 
network conditions (e.g. average commercial 
speed) that are not under the control of local op-
erators. Hence, the design of producer perform-
ance evaluation procedures able to encompass 
external sources of inefficiency should be re-
garded as a major concern in efficiency analysis 
for the industry. In the light of this, we adopt a 
recently developed methodology within the line 
of research of DEA-based models (Fried et al., 
2002) incorporating exogenous (i.e. regulatory 
and environmental) effects and statistical noise. 
Previous literature has dealt with the role 
played by different subsidization mechanisms in 
explaining inefficiency differentials among LPT 
operators, reaching the uncontroversial conclu-
sion that the predictions from incentive theory 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993) help explain differ-
ences in productive efficiency among firms. 
This stream of research includes the contribu-
tions by Kerstens (1996) and Gagnepain and 
Ivaldi (2002a, b) for the French urban transit in-
dustry, and by Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1997, 
2003) for Norway. More recently, Piacenza 
(2006) has investigated the LPT Italian case, 
controlling for the environmental characteris-
tics of each network. His analysis is based on 
a panel data of firms managed under two regula-
tory schemes (i.e. cost-plus or fixed-price) and 
facing different levels of network commercial 
speed. The main conclusion is that – given simi-
lar network characteristics – firms under a fixed-
price mechanism exhibit a lower distortion from 
minimum cost than operators subjected to a 
cost-plus regulation. Furthermore, to some ex-
tent the inefficiency differentials among compa-
nies are found to be due to differences in the 
network characteristics (commercial speed lev-
els). 
This study aims at investigating the impact of 
exogenous factors on the X-efficiency of the 
Italian LPT industry, within a DEA-based 
framework which takes also into account the 
presence of statistical noise. More precisely, we 
intend to provide a decomposition of input-
specific DEA inefficiency measures into three 
components: environmental factors, pure mana-
gerial inefficiency, and random noise. Such a 
methodology proceeds in three steps. First, 
given a deterministic non-parametric reference 
technology for LPT operators consisting of four 
inputs (drivers, indirect employees, fuel, and 
materials and services) and one output (seat-
kilometers) we run the initial performance 
evaluation using DEA. Second, a Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach is adopted to 
regress stage-one input slacks on a set of regula-
tory and environmental variables. Finally, we re-
run DEA on inputs quantities purged of both ex-
ogenous effects and statistical noise.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 1 presents the main features of 
the Italian LPT industry. The focus will be on 
both the institutional context and the regulation 
T Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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of subsidies, in order to clarify the relevance of 
the research issue under investigation. Section 2 
details the employed methodology, mainly refer-
ring to Fried et al. (2002). Section 3 deals with 
the presentation of the frontier model to be esti-
mated, underlying the peculiarities of our em-
pirical implementation. First, we concentrate on 
the specification of the deterministic non-
parametric reference technology of service sup-
pliers. Then, we discuss the relevance of the 
regulatory and environmental characteristics in-
cluded in the estimated SFA regression equa-
tions and introduce the expected sings for the 
coefficients of variables used as proxies for sub-
sidization mechanisms and other non-
discretionary factors. Section 4 gives detail on 
the dataset used in the estimations. Results are 
reported in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
1.  THE ITALIAN FRAMEWORK 
The characteristic of universal service that Local 
Authorities usually attribute to LPT imposes the 
maintenance of low tariff levels. Thus the LPT 
operators have to face structural balance defi-
cits, which need public subsidies to be refilled. 
A typical and critical issue for regulation Au-
thorities is therefore to assure the economic and 
financial brake-even of LPT operators, but at the 
same time to minimize the waste of public 
funds.  
In Italy (as in most of European Countries), 
during the ‘70s and the ‘80s costs of LPT firms 
have risen more than revenues. The first effort 
to face this problem has been implemented in 
the Law 151/1981, which provided for an ex 
ante definition of subsidy levels, yearly allo-
cated to the National Transport Fund (NTF) and 
then assigned to the providers. The amount 
yearly allotted might act as a compensation to 
operators for providing services at a price lower 
than its costs. The remaining deficit should have 
been balanced by selling transport services. De-
spite this rule, both the high inflation rates (not 
taken into account in the centralized allotment) 
and the decrease of demand levels contributed to 
enhance firms’ deficits and compelled the cen-
tral Government to allocate ex-post funds. Not-
withstanding this kind of cost-plus grant acted 
only as stopgap measures, and has been unable 
to readjust industry accounts. 
In practice, before 1996 all LPT Italian pro-
viders received cost-plus reimbursements, char-
acterized by the full recovery of budget losses 
by local authorities.
1 In this context, the firm 
bears neither industrial risk (risks on costs) nor 
commercial risk (risks on revenue). According 
with the new theory of regulation (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993), in this situation the operator is not 
residual claimant for effort and so it has no in-
centives to produce efficiently. During the ‘90s 
radical regulatory changes have been introduced 
to improve both service efficiency and effec-
tiveness. First the law 549/1995 established the 
abolition of the NTF (since 1996) and the allo-
cation of the public funds responsibility to the 
Regions, who are in charge of the LPT pro-
gramming as well. For this reason since 1996 
some local authorities have introduced ex ante 
reimbursement mechanisms (fixed-price 
schemes), which provide different risk-sharing 
schemes between firm and local authority. 
Compared to cost-plus schemes, the companies 
subjected to fixed-price mechanisms face high-
powered incentives towards a cost minimizing 
behavior.
2 Then the Legislative Decrees 
422/1997 and 400/1999 provided a guide for 
transport system reform to be implemented by 
each Region. 
The main purpose of the whole transport re-
form is to stimulate the recovery of LPT suppli-
ers’ productive efficiency, first by increasing the 
financial responsibility of all the subjects operat-
ing in the sector (local authorities and LPT 
firms). For this reason the transfers from the 
central government have been replaced with re-
gional taxes, in order to encourage an efficient 
use of public local resources. The reform also 
provides for a clear distinction between pro-
gramming and regulatory functions (assigned to 
                                                                    
1 European Commission (1998). 
2 It is worthwhile to underline that both cost-plus and 
fixed-price schemes are not optimal rules in the sense 
specified by the new theory of regulation. According to this 
approach, because of the presence of informational 
constraints, optimal mechanisms must solve the trade-off 
between the efficiency incentives typical of fixed-price 
schemes and the rent extraction properties of a cost-plus 
regulation. The complex problem of designing an optimal 
contract is beyond the scope of this study, as only fixed-
price or cost-plus subsidization mechanisms are carried out 
at the present time in the Italian LPT industry. Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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public administrators) and the industrial man-
agement (assigned to LPT companies).  
Secondly, the reform tries to introduce some 
competition “for the market” in the sector, by 
requiring competitive tendering procedures to 
allot LPT services. Competitive tendering in the 
assignment of franchised monopolies is the main 
mechanism to create competitive pressure when 
the open competition is not possible or is not 
economic. Therefore, if competition in the mar-
ket is not feasible for technical reasons, the only 
way to enhance efficiency is to introduce com-
petition for the market (Demsetz, 1968; Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993). Foreign experiences of com-
petitive tendering in LPT sector have produced 
some positive effects both on productivity and 
cost savings (Cambini and Filippini, 2003). 
However, the adoption of tendering procedures 
is not so simple, local authorities having to cor-
rectly define the structure of a competitive ten-
dering procedure in order to avoid negative ef-
fects for the whole LPT market and hence for 
customers. 
Moreover the Law states that the relation-
ships between the regulator and the LPT pro-
vider have to be outlined by means of a formal 
agreement: the ‘service contract’. It should 
clearly name the service duties of the LPT com-
pany as well as the regulator/operator risk-
sharing scheme and the ways to determine the 
amount of settlements. Each service contract has 
to have certain financial allotment in the regula-
tor budget and to contain instruments to improve 
firms’ efficiency. Anyway the transfer from the 
local authority has to be ex-ante defined, on the 
basis of expected operating costs (gross cost ap-
proach) or expected operating deficits (net cost 
approach), and the amount of actual costs (or 
deficits) has not to influence the level of subsi-
dies (fixed-price contract). 
One of the goal of the present paper is to in-
vestigate  input-by-input whether public transit 
companies running under fixed-price regimes 
are more efficient than those operating under 
cost-plus schemes, due to stronger incentives to 
increase managerial effort, taking also into ac-
count firm-specific network characteristics. On 
the policy side, this investigation allows us to 
assess whether subsidization schemes recently 
introduced in Italy have proved suitable in order 
to recover efficiency, which is one of the goals 
pursued by the legislative reform, also highlight-
ing the management areas where the rationaliza-
tion attempt resulted more effective. In addition, 
we may extend previous evidence on the rele-
vance of incentive theory and modern regulatory 
economics for the production analysis of public 
utilities.  
2.  ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
Our approach is based on the three-stage meth-
odology proposed by Fried et al. (2002), 
whereby we account for the impact of external 
conditions (regulatory and environmental fac-
tors) and statistical noise in a DEA-based pro-
ducer performance evaluation framework. The 
aim is to identify three input-specific determi-
nants of inefficiency – exogenous factors, pure 
managerial inefficiency and statistical noise – in 
the Italian LPT industry.  
This section reviews Fried et al. (2002) 
methodology. Section 4 details the implementa-
tion of such methodology to our case study, fo-
cusing on the specification of nonparametric de-
terministic reference technology and on the 
modelling of regulatory schemes and other envi-
ronmental variables involved in the analysis.  
Consider I Decision Making Units (DMUs) - 
with i = 1, …, I - each of them employing N in-
puts (n = 1,…, N) to produce M outputs (m = 1, 
…, M). DEA-based measures of the i
th producer 
performance – relative to the best-practise non-
parametric frontier – has the limitation of ne-
glecting two possible sources of inefficiency. 
First, DEA models are solely based on inputs 
and outputs data. However, the external condi-
tions under which the i
th production is carried 
out can be relatively favorable/unfavorable – as 
compared to other firms in the comparison set – 
due to the positive/negative impact of any ob-
servable exogenous characteristics. Second, any 
other unobservable factors and omitted variables 
are also ruled out from the performance evalua-
tion, the DEA framework being deterministic. 
Hence, accounting for neither of these non-
discretionary differentials across firms belong-
ing to the comparison set might lead to 
over/under-evaluated performances and mis-
leading rankings.  Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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A solution to such limitation is given by the 
adoption of SFA in order to decompose DEA 
input slacks into exogenous effects, managerial 
inefficiency and statistical noise (Fried et al., 
2002). We apply this approach to the Italian 
public transit systems.
3 Using data on observed 
inputs and outputs, a standard input-oriented 
variable returns to scale envelopment problem is 
solved for each i
th firm in the sample (Banker et 
al., 1984):  
 
λ θ,
min     θ     [ 1 ]  
subject to  λ θ X xi ≥   
     i y Y ≥ λ      
     0 ≥ λ      
     1 = λ
T e     
 
where xi is the i
th DMU (N x 1) non-negative 
vector of inputs; yi is the i
th DMU (M x 1) non-
negative vector of outputs; λ = [λ1, …, λI] is an 
(I x 1) vector of intensity variables; X = [x1, …, 
xI] is an (N x I) matrix of input vectors in the 
comparison set; Y = [y1, …, yI] is an (M x I) ma-
trix of output vectors in the comparison set; e = 
[1, …, 1] is a (I x 1) unit vector. The solution of 
the above linear programming problem in terms 
of non-negative and bounded to one optimal 
value  θ  allows to evaluate total slacks (radial 
plus non radial) for each input as the non-
negative scalars: 
 
λ n ni ni X x s − = ;  n = 1,..., N and  i = 1, ..., I.    [2] 
 
Stage two involves the estimation of N sto-
chastic frontier equations. In each of them the 
dependent variable is the n
th total input slack and 
the independent variables are the z non-
discretionary regulatory and environmental vari-
ables. The aim is to purge slacks of external ef-
fects and statistical noise not accounted for in 
stage one, letting each of the exogenous charac-
teristics producing a different impact across the 
SFA equations.
4 The N separate SFA regressions 
                                                                    
3 For a discussion on previous approaches attempting to 
incorporate environmental variables in DEA-like model, see 
Fried et al. (2002). 
4 The alternative strategy would be to estimate (M + N) 
regressions. For a discussion of advantages and 
disadvantages of both estimation strategies see Fried et al. 
(2002). 
take the following form: 
 




ni u z f s + + = υ β ,          [3] 
 
where zi = [z1i, …, zKi] is a vector of K exoge-
nous variables and β
n are unknown parameters 
to be estimated and (υni + uni) is a composite er-
ror term. The component υni ~ (0, σ
2
υn) repre-
sents statistical noise, while the one-sided trun-





flects pure managerial inefficiency, with mean 
µ
n and variability σ
2
un across observed slacks of 
the n
th input. For the alternative assumption of 
half-normal distributed managerial inefficiency, 




The deterministic feasible slack frontier term 
f
n(zi, β
n) captures the impact of observable ex-
ternal factors (regulation and environmental 
characteristics) on the stage-one slacks. Once 
statistical noise is accounted for, the stochastic 
feasible slack frontiers is given by the expres-
sion f
n(zi,  β
n) + υni, which indicates the mini-
mum achievable slack in a noisy context. Under 
the alternative distributional assumptions on the 
inefficiency error term – truncated and half- 
normal distributions – the parameters to be es-
timated using a maximum likelihood (ML) tech-
nique are given by (β
n,










un) respectively. Given the obtained esti-
mates for β
n and υni, adjusted input quantities 
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ni z z x x υ υ β β max max            [4] 
 
where the first term in square brackets force all 
firms to operate in the least favourable environ-
ment observed in the sample, while the second 
term in square brackets forces all firms to oper-
ate in the unluckiest situation observed in the 
sample. By doing so, distortions from the effi-
cient usage of each input due to external factors 
and random noise, which are not under the con-
trol of LPT firms, are removed.  
The final step of the analysis consists of re-
runing the DEA-based producer performance 
evaluation using data on adjusted inputs in order 
to reflect differences in firms’ exogenous condi-
tions. The comparison between initial and final 
DEA efficiency measures gives the understand-Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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ing of the extent to which non-discretionary 
variables affect efficiency differentials, other 
things being equal. 
3.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.1  Technology 
In line with the mainstream of DEA and SFA 
literature, we adopt an input-oriented framework 
in the first DEA stage. This choice relies on the 
fact that firms are well-expected to minimise the 
use of inputs given the amount of output they 
provide.  
A fundamental stage in any DEA assessment 
is the specification of a set of variables that cor-
rectly capture the underlying technology (Tha-
nassoulis, 2001). The identification of a bundle 
of inputs used in the procurement of a bundle of 
corresponding outputs is thus needed. Environ-
mental factors that might affect the efficiency of 
transformation of inputs into outputs are not 
considered at this phase, because they will be 
taken into account in the second SFA-based 
stage. With regards to the output measure, in 
principle one might try to estimate the efficiency 
conditions either in a demand or a supply-
related framework. De Borger et al. (2002) point 
out that supply-related output indicators might 
be considered to a larger extent under the con-
trol of the management than the demand of tran-
sit service by passengers. It should be recog-
nised that the decisions on the service level pro-
vision are not totally under the control of the 
firm because of the presence of regulatory con-
straints on the supply. However, it is reasonable 
to think that such constraints are the outcome of 
some negotiation process with the regulatory au-
thorities. Thus, following Piacenza (2006) a 
supply-oriented framework is adopted in this 
study and a measure that captures the production 
capacity of the firms is needed.  
Two alternative conventional output meas-
ures usually adopted in the public transit litera-
ture are the yearly vehicle-kilometres and the 
yearly seat-kilometres. The first one is calcu-
lated as the total number of vehicles in the fleet 
times the average distance yearly covered by 
each vehicle. The second one is calculated as the 
total number of vehicles in the fleet times the 
average size of the vehicles in terms of seats 
times the average distance yearly covered by 
each vehicle. The second output indicator seems 
to provide better information on the amount of 
the service as it takes into account the differen-
tiation in size among firms’ vehicles. Thus, we 
chose the latter (SKM) as our preferable output 
measure. 
The conventional inputs used in the DEA 
frontier analyses are labour, fuel and other mate-
rials and services.
5 Labour has been included by 
splitting the number of workers in two catego-
ries: drivers (emplDR) and indirect employees 
(emplIND). The reason of this decomposition 
stands on the predominance of the cost of driv-
ers as percentage of total labour cost. Thus, it 
might be interesting to investigate the conditions 
of use of this category of workers in isolation 
from non-drivers.
6 Fuel (FUEL) is measured as 
the total amount of yearly consumed litres of 
gasoline (or equivalent kilowatt-hours of en-
ergy). Other materials and services is a not ho-
mogeneous item. A physical measure is not 
available for this input, hence we chose to use 
the corresponding cost (CMS), opportunely de-
flated
7 so as to avoid any problem regarding 
changes in prices. The cost of materials and ser-
vices has been derived by the balance-sheets of 
the firms as difference between the total operat-
ing expenditure and the costs of labour and fuel. 
It includes various types of costs within which 
the highest percentage belongs to the costs for 
maintenance and outsourced services. Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics on output and inputs 





                                                                    
5 See De Borger et al. (2002) for a comprehensive review 
of the inputs most widely considered in the transit industry 
6 Although we will present the results on both the inputs, 
we will focus on drivers as they are the main source of costs 
for the firms. 
7 The deflator is the production price index. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for output and input variables 
Type of LPT system  SKM (10
6)
 a  emplDR
 b  emplIND





Urban            
Mean 1,166  532  274  5,565  14,242 
Standard Deviation 1,507 602  392 7,446  20,425 
          
Minimum 48  23  4  233  435 
1
st quartile  246  133  42  1,269  3,943 
Median 883  344  110  3,865  9,557 
3
rd quartile  1,199  595  307  6,299  14,164 
Maximum 6,554  2,758 1,698  33,143  102,436 
          
Variability index*  129%  113%  143%  134%  143% 
Mixed         
Mean 1,062  507  212  4,999  16,254 
Standard Deviation  973  535  310  4,397  18,939 
          
Minimum 59  30  4  352  1,184 
1
st quartile  427  173  54  2,168  4,885 
Median 891  369  97  4,120  9,704 
3
rd quartile  1,102  464  174  5,335  15,822 
Maximum 3,909  2,290 1,323  18,103 86,427 
          
Variability index  92%  106%  146%  88%  117% 
Intercity          
Mean 820  335  163  4,035  9,285 
Standard Deviation  578  288  258  2,667  6,064 
          
Minimum 148  78  26  1,037  1,924 
1
st quartile  326  196  60  1,894  4,118 
Median 735  250  79  3,673  7,753 
3
rd quartile  1,122  342  151  4,775  11,114 
Maximum 2,043  1,339 1,307  10,500 24,536 
          
Variability index  71%  86%  158%  66%  65% 
* The variability index is computed as the ratio between standard deviation and mean. 
a SKM =  number of yearly seat-kilometers supplied.  
b emplDR and emplIND = number of drivers and indirect employees, respectively.  
c FUEL = litres of gasoline consumed. 
d CMS = real value of yearly expenses for materials and services. 
 
 
Following Fried et al. (2002), capital input 
has not been considered either as stock measure 
or as depreciation in the DEA model. Capital is 
a non-discretionary input, at least in the short-
run, and the imposition of a quasi-fixed input in 
the minimisation DEA algorithm would have 
resulted in a significant shrinking of the set of 
peers so that each unit could have appeared as 
unique and with an efficiency score close to 
unity.
8 However, capital has been recovered as a 
control variable in the second SFA stage 
through the inclusion of size dummy variables, 
where size is measured in terms of the number 
of vehicles in the rolling stock. This solution al-
                                                                    
8 See Coelli et al. (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) for 
more details on the treatment of quasi-fixed inputs. 
lows us to avoid the difficult and inevitably im-
perfect construction of a time series of the re-
placement cost for capital, adjusted for taking 
into account inflation and/or revaluations. As 
during the period under investigation the major-
ity of the firms undertook a reorganisation proc-
ess passing from municipal firms to limited 
companies, the above-mentioned fixed assets 
revaluation could have represented a serious 
problem. 
3.2  Regulation and environmental factors 
As stated above, any efficiency comparison 
should not neglect the external conditions under 
which firms operate. Such characteristics might Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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create advantages or disadvantages for the firms 
so that the efficiency scores might result heavily 
affected. In other words, a high/low efficiency 
score might be attributed to a favourable/not fa-
vourable action of exogenous variables rather 
than to the actual effort/inadequacy of the man-
agers. Hence, the resulting ranking of the firms 
should be viewed as a very preliminary one, re-
quiring an adjustment to embody the impact of 
exogenous variables. These variables cannot be 
included as inputs or outputs, being out of the 
control of the management. 
We consider two exogenous sources of effi-
ciency differentials across LPT suppliers: the 
regulatory policy context and the environmental 
non-discretionary characteristics. In the follow-
ing we provide microeconomic insights on the 
variables included into the analysis in order to 
capture both sources of inefficiency, discussing 
their expected effects on each considered input. 
All firms in the sample experienced a change 
in the regulation during the period under inves-
tigation. The decentralisation of the financial 
responsibility at a regional level has increased 
the power of the regions in selecting service ar-
eas to be subsidised. Furthermore, local public 
authorities gradually abandoned previous cost-
plus schemes based on a full ex-post coverage of 
the losses, adopting risk-sharing fixed-price 
schemes which allow for a rent and at the same 
time are expected to stimulate the firms to a bet-
ter performance through a tighter control on the 
inputs.  
The impact of regulatory schemes has been 
analysed by Kerstens (1996) for France under a 
DEA framework. In particular, the author veri-
fied that the efficiency scores under different 
non-parametric frontier specifications are more 
related to high-powered incentive schemes if 
seat-kilometres are used as output variable. 
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a, b) and Dalen and 
Gomez-Lobo (1997) assessed the impact of 
fixed-price policy on the managerial effort for 
French and Norwegian bus industries using a 
structural cost function model based on a princi-
pal-agent framework. They empirically demon-
strated that the fixed-price policy dominates 
cost-plus schemes and that the underlying yard-
stick mechanism can help the regulator to re-
duce the lack of information on the firm’s cost 
structure. Finally, Dalen and Gomez-Lobo 
(2003) and Piacenza (2006) analysed the effects 
of the adoption of high-powered incentive 
schemes of subsidization respectively for Italy 
and Norway within the SFA framework pro-
posed by Battese and Coelli (1995). Both studies 
shed some light on the effectiveness of risk-
sharing contracts (yardstick and fixed-price type 
of regulation) in enhancing efficiency. So we 
expect that the introduction of fixed-price 
schemes will increase the level of efficiency and 
reduce the slacks in the use of the resources, at 
least for those inputs that are more suitable for 
rationalisation, such as drivers and costs of ma-
terials and services. Regulation (REG) is in-
cluded in our model as a dummy variable that 
assumes, for each firm, value 1 after the intro-
duction of a fixed-price contract and 0 otherwise. 
Non-discretionary characteristics include 
variables linked to network features – namely, 
average commercial speed and population den-
sity – as well as to other environmental factors 
outside the control of the managers, such as av-
erage fleet age, operational size and technologi-
cal change (Dalen and Gomez-Lobo, 2003; 
Piacenza, 2006).  
Average commercial speed (SPEED) is a 
well-recognised relevant network characteristics 
for several reasons and is commonly used as a 
proxy for congestion costs. As average speed 
declines, due to higher congestion or lack of 
preferential lanes, the number of vehicles per 
kilometre is expected to increase together with 
the number of engaged drivers. Furthermore, 
more frequent stop and go or prolonged stops 
due to highly busied routes are likely to enhance 
fuel consumption. Finally, lower network speeds 
imply higher maintenance  or  repairmen  costs 
due to more accidents.
9 Summarizing, we postu-
late a positive effect of higher average speed on 
technical efficiency trough a reduction of the 
slacks for drivers, fuel and materials and ser-
vices, whereas the impact on indirect workers is 
ambiguous. 
Population density (DENS) has been calcu-
lated as population per squared kilometre in the 
transport service provided area. Like average 
speed, population density might be interpreted 
as a measure of congestion, and so reducing ef-
                                                                    
9 In fact, if average network speed reduces, the 
probability that an accident occurs is higher, even if perhaps 
the gravity of accidents will be softened. Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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ficiency. On the other hand, this variable could 
affect the way the network is designed, with 
more or less stops along the lanes, and to some 
extent contribute to increase technical effi-
ciency. Hence, following Kerstens (1996), we 
do not pose a priori expectations on the effect of 
density variable on the input slacks. 
Average fleet age (AGE) is a variable that re-
flects average age of the transit vehicles. To the 
extent newer buses are more spacious than older 
ones, one could expect the newer the buses the 
smaller the number of vehicles in the fleet and 
consequently the number of drivers. However, 
this is a merely empirical consideration. Less 
ambiguous effects might be found with regards 
to fuel and costs of materials and services. In-
deed, a higher age could be reasonably associ-
ated with more frequent drawbacks and higher 
maintenance and repairmen costs. On the other 
hand, as suggested in Boame (2004), newer ve-
hicles might result in a reduction of familiarity 
with them, thus both increasing the number of 
accidents and extending holding time in the 
workshop. Furthermore, newer vehicles might 
be thought as more fuel-saving. Generally, we 
expect a reducing impact of average fleet age on 
fuel and other costs slacks. 
A time trend (TR) is included to account for 
any technological change. Although technical 
progress is a usual hypothesis, no a priori could 
be forecast, especially within a input-by-input 
framework. Since the second stage is a SFA-
based one, TR variable is interpreted to capture 
only technological shifts, and not changes in 
managerial performances, which are embodied 
in the one-sided distributed inefficiency compo-
nent specified in the Battese and Coelli (1992) 
SFA approach. 
Operational size is categorized through 
dummy variables (dBUS1, dBUS2, dBUS3 and 
dBUS4). Four groups are considered and catego-
rized on the basis of the quartile values in the 
number of vehicles. The dBUS1 category in-
cludes the smallest firms while the dBUS4 cate-
gory includes the largest ones. The dBUS1 
dummy variable has been dropped so as the pa-
rameters of other categories give us a measure 
of how slack-relative inefficiency changes if 
size moves upward. It could be argued that local 
governments are particularly careful in promot-
ing the use of public transit services in the pres-
ence of higher congestion. This is the case, for 
instance, of large urban networks, where traffic 
congestion can result in highly critical condi-
tions of circulation in peak-load periods, with 
social reflections (e.g. worsening of the quality 
of life due to strong air and acoustic pollution) 
that alert local governments. Therefore, in order 
to meet peak-load problems, more congested 
networks will be likely to receive proportionally 
higher subsidies for sustaining the investments 
in public transit service. The final result could 
be an excess endowment of vehicles with re-
spect to the optimal rolling stock and an overuse 
of the fleet with respect to the potential demand. 
This would consequently bring about an exces-
sive use of inputs for the largest and more con-
gested networks, especially for those inputs that 
are more directly linked with the circulation of 
the vehicles, such as drivers, fuel and material 
and service costs. It is therefore of interest to as-
sess the impact of the investments’ subsidization 
policy, as proxied by fleet size dummy vari-
ables, on the efficient use of the inputs. 
Finally, we introduced in our model dummy 
variables aimed at representing the specialised 
(urban transport, dURB and intercity transport, 
dINTC) or diversified typology of service (both 
urban and intercity transport, dMIX). This latter 
distinction seems to have a strong role in ex-
plaining cost differentials across firms (Fraquelli 
et al., 2004; Piacenza, 2006). Urban and inter-
city companies typically provide the LPT ser-
vice under very different operational conditions, 
especially in terms of congestion of the covered 
area. The dURB dummy variable has been 
dropped so as the parameters allow us to meas-
ure the overuse of inputs with respect to the ur-
ban networks. These dummies could overlap 
with average speed, as both are linked to con-
gestion, but it is likely that average speed can 
not be the unique distinctive feature among ty-
pologies of service. Thus we decided to main-
tain the service-specific dummies in order to 
capture as much as possible the above men-
tioned differences in the operational context. In 
any case, we do not put any a priori on these 
variables.
10 
                                                                    
10 It should be noted that Fraquelli et al. (2004) and 
Piacenza (2006) shed some light on higher potential cost 
savings of the mixed firms. These studies, however, use a 
cost function approach and do not allow therefore for an 
input-by-input decomposition. Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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4.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
The dataset used in the following analysis con-
sists of a balanced panel of 42 Italian public-
owned LPT companies which have been ob-
served during the period 1993-1999, for a total 
of 294 pooled observations.  
Our sample firms are fairly representative of 
the universe of Italian public transit systems and 
includes 6 small-sized operators (less than 150 
workers), 19 medium-sized (151-550 workers), 
and 17 large-sized (more than 550 workers). As 
for the type of service provided, 15 firms mostly 
operate in the urban context, 10 firms are spe-
cialized in the intercity service, and the remain-
ing 17 have activities in both compartments 
(multi-service or mixed firms). As for geo-
graphical distribution, 23 operators are located 
in the Northern Regions and 19 provide LPT 
service in Central and Southern Italy. Finally, as 
far as the subsidization mechanisms are con-
cerned, around twenty-four percent of observa-
tions (71 cases) relate to fixed-price regulatory 
schemes, while around seventy-six percent (223 
cases) refer to transit systems under cost-plus 
reimbursement rules. 
The information for the construction of the 
database has been gathered from different 
sources. The main economic and production 
data – as supplied seat-kilometres, total number 
of workers, fuel consumption, rolling stock size, 
total operating cost – have been extracted from 
the Yearly Surveys published by ASSTRA, the 
nationwide trade organization which associates 
the public-owned LPT companies. Disaggre-
gated information concerning technical and en-
vironmental characteristics (i.e. different ty-
pologies of workers, fleet age, average commer-
cial speed, population density) and cost catego-
ries (labor, fuel, materials and services) have 
been obtained through questionnaires sent to 
firms’ managers. In order to investigate the im-
pact of regulation on the efficient use of each 
input, we needed information on the subsidiza-
tion practice for the Italian public transit sys-
tems. To this end, we also included a question 
on the reimbursement mechanism (fixed-price 
or cost-plus) adopted by the competent local au-
thority (Region, Province or Town Council). 
5.  RESULTS 
The results of the first DEA stage, obtained 
separately by service category, are shown in Ta-
ble 4 below, which accommodates the compari-
son with the DEA-adjusted scores from the third 
stage. These preliminary unadjusted DEA scores 
indicate a mean efficiency level around 93% for 
the urban firms against a mean value of 85-86% 
for the mixed and intercity LPT systems. Fur-
thermore, it is noteworthy the lower variance of 
the efficiency scores for the urban category. 
Overall, this evidence implies that urban transit 
firms are closer to the efficiency frontier than 
their intercity and mixed counterparts and dif-
ferentials among companies in the former case 
are less marked. However, these efficiency 
scores are far to be reliable, as they do not take 
into account exogenous factors that might affect 
firms’ performance. 
Table 2 reports the results from second stage 
SFA input-by-input regressions. Within each 
equation all the firms from different service 
category have been gathered and the estimates 
have been then controlled for the effect type of 
network Exogenous regulatory and environ-
mental factors are included as non-discretionary 
determinants of input slacks, while the manage-
rial inefficiency component uni has been mod-
elled according to the time-variant specification 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992). This 
model assumes 
)] ( [ T t
ni nit e u u
− − =
η , where η  is a 
parameter to be estimated, t is the present year 
and T is the final year of the observed period. In 
obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of 
slack equations (3) the variance of the aggre-
gated error (υni  +  uni) is parameterized as 










un σ σ = γ  (for each 
equation n = 1, …, N). Thus, γ  represents the 
proportion in the total error variance that is at-
tributable to managerial inefficiency component. 
A likelihood ratio (LR) test for this structural 
parameter is also carried out and it provides an 
insight on whether or not pure managerial inef-
ficiency can be neglected from the analysis. In 
our specification we also assume the ineffi-




                                                                    
11 This assumption is corroborated by the fact that the 
truncated-normal hypothesis is rejected by the LR test. 
Moreover, the results do not change substantially according 
to the chosen assumption. Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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Table 2: SFA parameters estimates of input slack equations  
slack-emplDR slack-emplIND  slack-FUEL  slack-CMS  Variable 
Coefficient t-stat  p-value  Coefficient t-stat  p-value  Coefficient t-stat  p-value  Coefficient t-stat  p-value 
SPEED  -1.898 -2.46  0.014  -1.839 -3.10  0.002  -21.210 -3.33  0.001  -53.956  -1.39  0.164 
DENS  -0.007 -1.14  0.255  0.004  1.08  0.279  -0.020 -0.39  0.697  -0.027  -0.08  0.932 
AGE  -1.444 -0.87  0.385  0.419  0.36  0.719 20.949  1.35  0.177  138.475  1.48  0.138 
REG  -17.817 -2.09  0.036  0.110  0.02  0.987  -95.203 -1.15  0.252  -776.511  -1.95  0.052 
TR  7.816 3.54  0.000  -2.159  -1.21  0.227  -53.870 -2.19  0.029  223.943  1.56  0.118 
dBUS2  14.460 1.16  0.247  11.786 1.24  0.215  138.483 1.28  0.201  482.460  0.79  0.427 
dBUS3  51.739 3.69  0.000  27.187 2.63  0.008  434.319 3.28  0.001 1,922.477  2.90  0.004 
dBUS4  12.282 0.83  0.405  31.338 2.78  0.005  421.073 2.97  0.003 1,114.470  1.54  0.123 
dINTC  46.039 2.43  0.015  49.606 3.42  0.001  400.607 2.07  0.038  665.922  0.66  0.509 
dMIX  67.757 3.80  0.000  39.486 3.29  0.001  852.339 5.44  0.000 2,243.988  2.85  0.004 
η  0.270 11.18  0.000  -0.048 -1.27  0.203  -0.077 -2.17  0.030  0.154  2.94  0.003 
γ  0.436 4.40  0.000  0.689 9.12  0.000  0.835 17.87  0.000  0.429  3.16  0.000 
LR test γ = 0  249.322   0.000  84.595   0.000  121.198   0.000  89.308    0.000 
Wald χ
2 test  52.050   0.000 21.09   0.020 60.02   0.000 24.89    0.006 
observations  294      294     294     294   
log-likelihood -1,618.554      -1,490.153     -2,208.112     -2,712.801   
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The coefficients for SPEED variable appear 
to be highly significant, with the exception of 
CMS input, and show the expected negative 
sign. This implies that an increase in the average 
network speed would reduce the input slacks. 
Such a conclusion, which reconciles with the 
findings obtained by Piacenza (2006), could be 
of particular interest for the regulatory authority. 
In fact, any intervention concerning the local 
mobility aimed at favouring traffic flows (such 
as the introduction of traffic-lights or round-
bounds), as well as improving the programming 
of bus lanes, could have a significant impact on 
congestion costs and, through this way, on effi-
ciency conditions. 
The impact of DENS variable is not statisti-
cally significant and shows alternation in sign. 
So we can conclude that it does not affect the 
performance of LPT firms in our sample. Notice 
that this result does not create particular prob-
lems of interpretation, as we had not imposed 
any  a priori on the effect of this exogenous 
variable on input slacks.  
The parameter associated with the AGE vari-
able is generally not significant, but it become to 
some extent marginally significant with regards 
to  CMS input. Besides, it shows the expected 
sign. This would imply that the older the rolling 
stock, on average, the higher the excess ex-
penses for maintenance and repairmen. The in-
vestigation of the sign also matches with our as-
sumption about the FUEL input, even though in 
this case the t-statistic might not be considered 
marginally significant. Notice that the AGE co-
efficient for the emplDR input slack does not 
present the positive sign we have supposed; 
however, the t-test strongly reject the hypothesis 
of statistical significance. 
The policy REG variable matches our predic-
tions for emplDR and CMS inputs. The sign of 
the associated parameter is negative, thus indi-
cating a reduction in the slack as a consequence 
of the introduction of highly-powered (fixed-
price) subsidization contracts. The risk-sharing 
underlying mechanism seems to have worked 
successfully, by forcing LPT firms to reduce the 
overuse of drivers and the excess cost for mate-
rial and services. It is worthwhile to remark that 
drivers and material and service expenses can be 
better rationalized than other inputs (indirect 
employees and fuel), so the change in the regu-
latory practice succeeded in promoting ration-
alization where it resulted more plausible. This 
result confirms previous evidence on the effec-
tiveness of incentive subsidies in reducing pro-
duction inefficiency already obtained in Ker-
stens (1996), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a, b), 
Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1997; 2003) and 
Piacenza (2006). Moreover, it extends the latter 
by investigating the effects of different regula-
tory practices at single input level. 
As expected, the dummies associated with the 
largest size categories (dBUS3 and dBUS4) have 
a positive and generally significant impact on 
the input slacks. This means that if the firm size 
grows up, the efficiency conditions worsen. As 
already stated, this result might be associated 
with the subsidization practice of the most con-
gested networks. Our interpretation is that the 
conspicuous subsides to investments addressed 
to these LPT systems in order to meet local gov-
ernments’ social goals have actually brought 
about an overcapitalisation problem. This excess 
endowment of rolling stock has induced firms to 
provide service beyond the actual request of the 
users with detrimental effects on efficiency. 
However, reconciling the efficiency reasons 
with social goals is not a simple exercise, and, to 
a certain extent, some degree of production inef-
ficiency might be accepted if a good compro-
mise can be found to make the service more ef-
fective. 
The coefficients for the types of service 
(dINTC and dMIX) are in general highly signifi-
cant and exhibits positive signs, implying that 
intercity and diversified LPT companies are in-
trinsically affected by a higher inefficiency than 
firms operating in urban contexts. This is diffi-
cult to interpret, as the urban networks are usu-
ally characterised by a higher degree of traffic 
congestion and so they are expected to be less 
efficient. However, it is possible that other envi-
ronmental factors beyond congestion act and 
they are able to impact on efficiency conditions. 
In any case, our results contrast with the evi-
dence put forward by Fraquelli et al. (2004) and 
Piacenza (2006) of arising economies of scope 
for diversified public transit systems. 
After having controlled for the effects of 
regulation and environmental characteristics, it 
is worthy to analyse more in details the input-Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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by-input managerial inefficiency component 
(uni). The second stage SFA regressions provide 
more reliable measures of the pure managerial 
efficiency by purging DEA slacks of the impact 
of exogenous effects. Furthermore, the adopted 
SFA methodology is able to account for the ef-
fects of statistical noise that can be purged from 
original DEA scores as well. The observation of 
the γ parameter suggests that the impact of pure 
managerial inefficiency appears substantially 
limited, at least for drivers and material and ser-
vice costs, for which only about 43% of the ag-
gregate error term variability is due to ineffi-
ciency. This evidence outlines the non negligi-
ble role played by statistical noise as determi-
nant of the input slacks. In addition, the LR test 
rejected the null hypothesis that γ equals to zero, 
leading to the conclusion that even if regulatory 
and environmental factors other than noise exert 
a strong impact, they are unable to completely 
explain the whole variability observed in the es-
timated input slacks. A significant component, 
particularly relevant, for indirect employees and 
fuel whose values of γ  are remarkably higher 
(0.689 and 0.835 respectively) still remains at-
tributable to discrepancies among managerial 
performances. 
As for the parameter η, it is significantly dif-
ferent from zero except for emplIND, and its 
sign is positive for emplDR (0.270) and CMS 
(0.154). The latter result means that inefficiency 
term is decreasing over time. The yearly de-
crease in inefficiency would then be equal to 
around 23.6% in the first case and 14.3% in the 
second case. This reduction could seem a quite 
strong result. The interpretation could be 
searched in the gradual transformation of the or-
ganisational status the public transit systems 
were subjected to during the years under inves-
tigation. In fact, all the units changed their gov-
ernance model from municipal firms to limited 
companies. This decision imposed by the legis-
lator was not unexpected by the managers and 
the change drew a significant increase of the 
autonomy in the firms’ conduct. The above 
mentioned process did not take place suddenly 
and at the same time for all the companies. On 
the contrary, the process has been gradual and 
involved many steps with a straight negotiation 
between Local Authorities and LPT operators. 
Nevertheless, this process could have changed 
the firms’ flair and increased the liability of the 
managers, which in turn stimulated the endeav-
our to come up to an inefficiency reduction path, 
by a rationalization mainly of drivers and mate-
rial and service costs. It is worthwhile to under-
line that this trend of production efficiency dur-
ing the observed years is distinguished from 
technological change, which is captured by the 
time variable TR in the slack function specifica-
tion.
12 Notice, in particular, that production effi-
ciency for drivers and materials and services 
showed a progressive improvement during time, 
while technological change seems to have been 
subjected to a regress. In fact, the sign of pa-
rameter associated to TR is positive, even 
though for CMS the parameter is only margin-
ally significant. 
Once accounted for the impact of regulatory 
and environmental factors, the third stage has 
been carried out using the algorithm (4) for ad-
justing the inputs data. Table 3 shows, for each 
input categorised by typology of service, the dis-
tribution of the observations between favourable 
and unfavourable external conditions and statis-
tical noise (lucky versus unlucky conditions). 
The discriminatory average values have been 
calculated as the fitted values of the exogenous 
impact and the noise. The high coefficients of 
variation for external factors and variances for 
noise reveal that a non negligible part of the ob-
servation benefited from a highly favourable ex-
ogenous context and good luck as well as has 
been disadvantaged by exogenous conditions 
and bad luck. Therefore a correction for taking 
into account these effects is needed.  
Finally, following Fried et al. (2002), the ad-
vantaged firms have been aligned with the most 
disadvantaged ones. In other words the input 
data for the more advantaged firms have been 
increased to the extent their advantage could be 
completely absorbed, thus putting all the firms 
in the same condition. In such a manner the 
problematic presence of negative inputs could 
be avoided. Re-running DEA separately for each 
category of service gives rise to new adjusted 
efficiency coefficients no longer  affected by 
exogenous non controllable factors and random 
noise. The comparison between original and ad-
                                                                    
12 In a more general context we estimated also a SFA 
model with temporal dummies instead of a time trend. The 
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justed DEA scores is showed in Table 4. As ex-
pected, the mean efficiency arises for all types 
of service, and especially for intercity and diver-
sified firms that were more affected by intrinsic 
inefficiency. Moreover, the dispersion around 
the average appears reduced as consequence of 
the exclusion of part of the heterogeneity among 
operators. By aligning the firms on the less fa-
vourable conditions, a large part of the observa-
tions were put in a better light as demonstrated 
by the higher number of upward movements of 
the scores with respect to downward move-
ments. 
Anyway, it should be noted that if we observe 
the minimum adjusted DEA efficiency scores 
large bags of inefficiency remain reaching the 
extreme values (13.8%) for intercity networks. 
 


























Intercity networks  emplDR  34 33  3.330  34 33  34.74 
  emplIND  30 37  1.889  42 25  45.65 
  FUEL  36 31  8.090  32 35  192.62 
  CMS  36 31  2.762  32 35  903.12 
Mixed networks  emplDR  63 59  0.582  64 58  62.47 
  emplIND  55 67  1.710  61 61  31.72 
  FUEL  56 66  0.483  61 61  504.88 
  CMS  56 66  0.560  76 46  2725.99 
Urban networks  emplDR  56 49  2.686  55 50  24.70 
  emplIND  51 54  1.271  48 57  21.79 
  FUEL  55 50  1.425  53 52  195.47 
  CMS  57 48  1.617  54 51  1590.78 
 
Table 4: Original (orig) and adjusted (adj) DEA efficiency scores 
  Urban networks  Mixed networks  Intercity networks 
 DEA-adj  DEA-orig  DEA-adj  DEA-orig DEA-adj DEA-orig 
Mean efficiency  98.75 93.11 99.09 85.45 97.90 86.46 
Minimum  91.95 73.01 93.24 64.72 86.20 48.20 
1
st quartile  98.07 87.97 98.87 77.99 97.03 77.33 
2
nd quartile  99.48 95.33 99.79 83.32 99.66 93.27 
3
rd quartile  100.00 100.00 100.00  97.51 100.00 100.00 
Variance  1.74 7.13 1.41  10.33 3.60  15.75 
# efficient units  40 30 49 22 30 19 
# downward shifts  8   7   2  
# movements from the frontier  6   7   2  
# upward shifts  73   100   48  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The main methodological issue this paper has 
investigated concerns the scope for avoiding 
some drawbacks typical of DEA assessment of 
production inefficiency in public transit systems 
and, more generally, in regulated network utili-
ties. Because of the presence of different exoge-
nous factors and random noise, which are not 
accounted for in standard deterministic DEA 
methodology, the latter may lead to imprecise 
and unreliable estimates of firms’ inefficiency: 
some production units could benefit from a par-
ticularly favourable (unfavourable) external con-
text, such as for instance high-powered (low-
powered) incentive regulation or high (low) 
network speed, as well as from a lucky 
(unlucky) situation linked to unpredictable and 
often unobservable events. This firm-specific 
heterogeneity would therefore be mixed with 
good (bad) performances due to managerial 
skills, thus resulting in an excessively high (low) 
efficiency scores. 
The approach we have adopted to overcome 
the above shortcomings is based on the three-
stage methodology proposed by Fried et al. 
(2002). The latter allowed us to control for the 
impact of regulatory policy, environmental 
characteristics and statistical noise within a 
mixed DEA-SFA framework for firms’ per-
formance evaluation. In particular, stage two in-
volved the estimation of stochastic frontier 
equations separately for each production factor, 
having the corresponding DEA input slacks cal-
culated at stage one as dependent variable and 
non-discretionary regulatory and environmental 
factors as explicative variables. The aim was to 
purge slacks of external effects and statistical 
noise not accounted for in stage one, by letting 
the exogenous characteristics generating a dif-
ferent impact on each input excess. This feature 
of the empirical strategy represents a second 
important methodological aspect addressed in 
the study. In fact, the results from stage two, be-
sides  to permit the re-running of DEA using ad-
justed input quantities (third stage), provide also 
novel evidence on the impact of the three types 
of determinants of input-specific resource 
wastes: regulation and environmental character-
istics, the so-called pure managerial ineffi-
ciency, and statistical noise. 
The issues analyzed have also proved fruitful 
from the perspective of empirical regulatory 
economics and the policy implications the latter 
provides. To date a limited number of studies 
have analyzed how LPT systems actually re-
spond to changes in regulatory incentives. Pre-
vious literature on this subject include the con-
tributions by Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1997; 
2003), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a, b), Ker-
stens (1996) and Piacenza (2006). Although all 
these studies concluded that incentive theory 
and modern regulatory economics are necessary 
components for the production analysis of LPT 
systems, none of them has tried to disentangle 
the role played by regulation and other firm-
specific exogenous factors (e.g. network charac-
teristics) from the one attributable to pure man-
agement skills in causing the arising of global 
production efficiency. Furthermore, Gagnepain 
and Ivaldi (2002a, b) and Dalen and Gomez-
Lobo (1997) identified a priori a lack of produc-
tivity in labor factor (in particular in driver cate-
gory) as the main source of inefficiency, due to 
the strong incidence of this input on total operat-
ing costs (70% on average in our sample) and to 
the presence of significant informational asym-
metries between LPT operator and regulator as 
for the actual input needs in the production 
process. However, no attempt has been made by 
this group of studies to provide explicit evidence 
on the determinants of efficiency differentials 
among firms at single input level, in spite of the 
importance of this aspect to assess whether cur-
rent regulatory policy is properly addressed to-
wards a more rational and thrifty management 
of resources.  
Our principal finding is that, after controlling 
for the subsidization scheme, environmental 
characteristics, and statistical noise, average 
production efficiency in the LPT industry in-
creases and the dispersion among operators sig-
nificantly reduces. From this result one can de-
duce that the main source for inefficiency has to 
be searched for in non-discretionary exogenous 
factors and random events under which LPT 
companies operate, while pure managerial skills 
only play a minor role. Secondly, the implemen-
tation of high-powered incentive contracts 
(fixed-price subsidies) as well as the presence of 
favourable network conditions (high commercial 
speed) reveal a marked ability of enhancing Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
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production efficiency already highlighted by 
previous empirical literature. As for Italy, this 
evidence confirms the policy indications by 
Piacenza (2006), which point out a scope for 
public transport policy to increase efficiency by 
acting on both subsidies and local traffic regula-
tion. Finally, the reducing impact on input 
wastes exerted by incentive mechanisms is 
found to be particularly evident in the usage of 
“drivers” and “materials and services”. Such a 
result sheds some light on the determinants of 
input-specific efficiency differentials in the in-
dustry, thus extending the existing evidence on 
mean overall inefficiency. Moreover, from a 
policy point of view, it provides useful insights 
on the effectiveness of the ongoing Italian regu-
latory reform, which seems to have well worked 
on the management of those production factors 
that are more sensitive to rationalisation. 
 
REFERENCES 
Aigner D., Lovell C. A. K. and Schmidt P. (1977), 
“Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic 
Frontier Production unction Models”, Journal 
of Econometrics 6(1), pp. 21–37. 
Banker R. D., Charnes A. and Cooper W. W. 
(1984), “Some Models for Estimating Techni-
cal and Scale Inefficiencies in Data Envelop-
ment Analysis”, Management Science 30(9), 
pp. 1078-1092. 
Battese G.E. and Coelli T. (1992), “Frontier pro-
duction function, technical efficiency and panel 
data: with application to paddy farmers in In-
dia”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 3(1-2), 
pp. 153-169. 
Battese G. E. and Coelli T. J. (1995), “A Model for 
Technical Inefficiency Effects in a Stochastic 
Frontier Production Function for Panel Data”, 
Empirical Economics, 20, pp. 325-332. 
Boame A. K. (2004), “Technical Efficiency of Ca-
nadian Urban Transit Systems”, Transportation 
Research - Part E: Logistics and Transporta-
tion Review, 40(5), pp. 401-416. 
Cambini C. and Filippini M. (2003), “Competitive 
Tendering and Optimal Size in the Regional 
Bus Transportation Industry: An Example from 
Italy”, Annals of Public and Cooperative Eco-
nomics, 74(1), pp. 163-182. 
Charnes A., Cooper W. W. and Rhodes E. (1978), 
“Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making 
Units”, European Journal of Operational Re-
search, 2(6), pp. 429-444. 
Dalen D. M. and Gomez-Lobo A. (1997), “Cost 
Functions in Regulated Industries Character-
ized by Asymmetric Information”, European 
Economic Review, 41(3-5), pp. 935-42. 
Dalen D. M. and Gomez-Lobo A. (2003), “Yard-
sticks on the Road: Regulatory Contracts in the 
Norwegian Bus Industry”, Transportation, 30, 
pp. 371-386. 
De Borger B., Kerstens K. and Costa A. (2002), 
“Public transit performance: what does one 
learn from frontier studies?”, Transport Re-
views, 22(1), pp.1-38. 
Demsetz H. (1968), “Why Regulate Utilities?”, 
Journal of Law and Economics, 11, pp. 55-65. 
European Commission (1998), Improved Structure 
and Organisation for Urban Transport Opera-
tions of Passengers in Europe (ISOTOPE), 
Transport Research, Fourth Framework Pro-
gramme, Urban Transport VII-51. 
Coelli T. J., Rao D. S. P. and Battese G. E. (1998), 
An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers. 
Fraquelli G., Piacenza M. and Abrate G. (2004), 
“Regulating Public Transit Networks: Ho Do 
Urban-Intercity Diversification and Speed-up 
Measures Affect Firms’ Cost Performance?”, 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 
75(2), pp. 193-225. 
Fried H. O., Lovell C. A. K., Schmidt S. S. and 
Yaisawarng S. (2002), “Accounting for Envi-
ronmental Effects and Statistical Noise in Data 
Envelopment Analysis”, Journal of Productiv-
ity Analysis, 17(1/2), pp. 157-74. 
Fried H. O., Schmidt S. S. and Yaisawarng S. 
(1999), “Incorporating the Operating Environ-
ment Into a Nonparametric Measure of Techni-
cal Efficiency”, Journal of Productivity Analy-
sis 12(3), pp. 249-67.  
Gagnepain P. and Ivaldi M. (2002a), “Incentive 
Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit 
Systems in France”, RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 33(4), pp. 605-29. 
Gagnepain P. and Ivaldi M. (2002b), “Stochastic 
Frontiers and Asymmetric Information Mod-
els”,  Journal of Productivity Analysis, 18(2), 
pp. 145-159.  
 Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
22 
Kerstens K. (1996), “Technical Efficiency Meas-
urement and Explanation of French Urban 
Transit Companies”, Transportation Research- 
Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 
30(6), pp. 431-452. 
Laffont J. J. and Tirole J. (1993), A Theory of In-
centives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
Piacenza M. (2006), “Regulatory Contracts and 
Cost Efficiency: Stochastic Frontier Evidence 
from the Italian Local Public Transport”, Jour-
nal of Productivity Analysis, 25(3), forthcom-
ing. 
Thanassoulis E. (2001), Introduction to the Theory 
and Application of Data Envelopment Analy-
sis: A Foundation Text with Integrated Soft-
ware, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell.  
   I
WORKING  PAPER  SERIES (2006-1993) 
2006 
1/06  Analisi della crescita economica regionale e convergenza: un nuovo approccio teorico ed evidenza empirica 
sull’Italia, by Mario Coccia 
2/06  Classifications of innovations: Survey and future directions, by Mario Coccia  
3/06  Analisi economica dell’impatto tecnologico, by Mario Coccia 
4/06  La burocrazia nella ricerca pubblica. PARTE  I Una rassegna dei principali studi, by Mario Coccia and 
Alessandro Gobbino 
5/06  La burocrazia nella ricerca pubblica. PARTE II Analisi della burocrazia negli Enti Pubblici di Ricerca, by Mario 
Coccia and Alessandro Gobbino 
6/06  La burocrazia nella ricerca pubblica. PARTE III Organizzazione e Project Management negli Enti Pubblici di 
Ricerca: l’analisi del CNR, by Mario Coccia, Secondo Rolfo and Alessandro Gobbino  
7/06  Economic and social studies of scientific research: nature and origins, by Mario Coccia 
8/06  Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital: Empirical Evidence from German and Italian Firms, by Julie 
Ann Elston and Laura Rondi 
9/06  Réflexions en thème de district, clusters, réseaux: le problème de la gouvernance, by Secondo Rolfo 
10/06  Models for Default Risk Analysis: Focus on Artificial Neural Networks, Model Comparisons, Hybrid 
Frameworks, by Greta Falavigna 
11/06  Le politiche del governo federale statunitense nell’edilizia residenziale. Suggerimenti per il modello italiano, by 
Davide Michelis 
12/06  Il finanziamento delle imprese Spin-off: un confronto fra Italia e Regno Unito, by Elisa Salvador 
13/06  SERIE SPECIALE IN COLLABORAZIONE CON HERMES: Regulatory and Environmental Effects on Public Transit 
Efficiency: a Mixed DEA-SFA Approach, by Beniamina Buzzo Margari, Fabrizio Erbetta, Carmelo Petraglia, 
Massimiliano Piacenza 
14/06  La mission manageriale: risorsa delle aziende, by Gian Franco Corio 
15/06  Peer review for the evaluation of the academic research: the Italian experience, by Emanuela Reale, Anna 
Barbara, Antonio Costantini 
2005 
1/05  Gli approcci biologici nell’economia dell’innovazione, by Mario Coccia 
2/05  Sistema informativo sulle strutture operanti nel settore delle biotecnologie in Italia, by Edoardo Lorenzetti, 
Francesco Lutman, Mauro Mallone  
3/05  Analysis of the Resource Concentration on Size and Research Performance. The Case of Italian National 
Research Council over the Period 2000-2004, by Mario Coccia and Secondo Rolfo 
4/05  Le risorse pubbliche per la ricerca scientifica e lo sviluppo sperimentale nel 2002, by Anna Maria Scarda  
5/05  La customer satisfaction dell’URP del Cnr. I casi Lazio, Piemonte e Sicilia, by Gian Franco Corio 
6/05  La comunicazione integrata tra uffici per le relazioni con il pubblico della Pubblica Amministrazione, by Gian 
Franco Corio 
7/05  Un’analisi teorica sul marketing territoriale. Presentazione di un caso studio. Il “consorzio per la tutela 
dell’Asti”, by Maria Marenna 
8/05  Una proposta di marketing territoriale: una possibile griglia di analisi delle risorse, by Gian Franco Corio 
9/05  Analisi e valutazione delle performance economico-tecnologiche di diversi paesi e situazione italiana, by Mario 
Coccia and Mario Taretto  
10/05  The patenting regime in the Italian public research system: what motivates public inventors to patent, by Bianca 
Potì and Emanuela Reale 
11/05  Changing patterns in the steering of the University in Italy: funding rules and doctoral programmes, by Bianca 
Potì and Emanuela Reale 
12/05  Una “discussione in rete” con Stanley Wilder, by Carla Basili 
13/05  New Tools for the Governance of the Academic Research in Italy: the Role of Research Evaluation, by Bianca 
Potì and Emanuela Reale 
14/05  Product Differentiation, Industry Concentration and Market Share Turbulence, by Catherine Matraves, Laura 
Rondi 
15/05  Riforme del Servizio Sanitario Nazionale e dinamica dell’efficienza ospedaliera in Piemonte, by Chiara Canta, 
Massimiliano Piacenza, Gilberto Turati 
16/05  SERIE SPECIALE IN COLLABORAZIONE CON HERMES: Struttura di costo e rendimenti di scala nelle imprese di 
trasporto pubblico locale di medie-grandi dimensioni, by Carlo Cambini, Ivana Paniccia, Massimiliano 
Piacenza, Davide Vannoni   II
17/05  Ricerc@.it - Sistema informativo su istituzioni, enti e strutture di ricerca in Italia, by Edoardo Lorenzetti, 
Alberto Paparello 
2004 
1/04  Le origini dell’economia dell’innovazione: il contributo di Rae, by Mario Coccia 
2/04  Liberalizzazione e integrazione verticale delle utility elettriche: evidenza empirica da un campione italiano di 
imprese pubbliche locali, by Massimiliano Piacenza and Elena Beccio 
3/04  Uno studio sull’innovazione nell’industria chimica, by Anna Ceci, Mario De Marchi, Maurizio Rocchi 
4/04  Labour market rigidity and firms’ R&D strategies, by Mario De Marchi and Maurizio Rocchi 
5/04  Analisi della tecnologia e approcci alla sua misurazione, by Mario Coccia 
6/04  Analisi delle strutture pubbliche di ricerca scientifica: tassonomia e comportamento strategico, by Mario Coccia 
7/04  Ricerca teorica vs. ricerca applicata. Un’analisi relativa al Cnr, by Mario Coccia and Secondo Rolfo 
8/04  Considerazioni teoriche sulla diffusione delle innovazioni nei distretti industriali: il caso delle ICT, by Arianna 
Miglietta 
9/04  Le politiche industriali regionali nel Regno Unito,  by Elisa Salvador 
10/04  Going public to grow? Evidence from a panel of Italian firms, by Robert E. Carpenter and L. Rondi 
11/04  What Drives Market Prices in the Wine Industry? Estimation of a Hedonic Model for Italian Premium Wine, by 
Luigi Benfratello, Massimiliano Piacenza and Stefano Sacchetto 
12/04  Brief notes on the policies for science-based firms, by Mario De Marchi, Maurizio Rocchi 
13/04  Countrymetrics e valutazione della performance economica dei paesi: un approccio sistemico, by Mario Coccia 
14/04  Analisi del rischio paese e sistemazione tassonomica, by Mario Coccia 
15/04  Organizing the Offices for Technology Transfer, by Chiara Franzoni 
16/04  Le relazioni tra ricerca pubblica e industria in Italia, by Secondo Rolfo 
17/04  Modelli di analisi e previsione del rischio di insolvenza: una prospettiva delle metodologie applicate, by Nadia 
D’Annunzio e Greta Falavigna 
18/04  SERIE SPECIALE: Lo stato di salute del sistema industriale piemontese: analisi economico-finanziaria delle 
imprese piemontesi, Terzo Rapporto 1999-2002, by Giuseppe Calabrese, Fabrizio Erbetta, Federico Bruno Rolle 
19/04  SERIE SPECIALE: Osservatorio sulla dinamica economico-finanziaria delle imprese della filiera del tessile e 
dell’abbigliamento in Piemonte, Primo rapporto 1999-2002, by Giuseppe Calabrese, Fabrizio Erbetta, Federico 
Bruno Rolle 
20/04  SERIE  SPECIALE:  Osservatorio sulla dinamica economico-finanziaria delle imprese della filiera dell’auto in 
Piemonte, Secondo Rapporto 1999-2002, by Giuseppe Calabrese, Fabrizio Erbetta, Federico Bruno Rolle 
2003 
1/03  Models for Measuring the Research Performance and Management of the Public Labs, by Mario Coccia, March 
2/03  An Approach to the Measurement of Technological Change Based on the Intensity of Innovation, by Mario 
Coccia, April 
3/03  Verso una patente europea dell’informazione: il progetto EnIL, by Carla Basili, June 
4/03  Scala della magnitudo innovativa per misurare l’attrazione spaziale del trasferimento tecnologico, by Mario 
Coccia, June 
5/03  Mappe cognitive per analizzare i processi di creazione e diffusione della conoscenza negli Istituti di ricerca, by 
Emanuele Cadario, July 
6/03  Il servizio postale: caratteristiche di mercato e possibilità di liberalizzazione, by Daniela Boetti, July 
7/03  Donne-scienza-tecnologia: analisi di un caso di studio, by Anita Calcatelli, Mario Coccia, Katia Ferraris and 
Ivana Tagliafico, July 
8/03  SERIE SPECIALE. OSSERVATORIO SULLE PICCOLE IMPRESE INNOVATIVE TRIESTE. Imprese innovative in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia: un esperimento di analisi congiunta, by Lucia Rotaris, July 
9/03  Regional Industrial Policies in Germany, by Helmut Karl, Antje Möller and Rüdiger Wink, July  
10/03  SERIE SPECIALE.  OSSERVATORIO SULLE PICCOLE  IMPRESE  INNOVATIVE  TRIESTE.  L’innovazione nelle new 
technology-based firms in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, by Paola Guerra, October 
11/03  SERIE SPECIALE.  Lo stato di salute del sistema industriale piemontese: analisi economico-finanziaria delle 
imprese piemontesi, Secondo Rapporto 1998-2001, December 
12/03  SERIE SPECIALE. Osservatorio sulla dinamica economico-finanziaria delle imprese della meccanica specializzata 
in Piemonte, Primo Rapporto 1998-2001, December 
13/03  SERIE SPECIALE. Osservatorio sulla dinamica economico-finanziaria delle imprese delle bevande in Piemonte, 
Primo Rapporto 1998-2001, December 
2002 
1/02  La valutazione dell’intensità del cambiamento tecnologico: la scala Mercalli per le innovazioni, by Mario 
Coccia, January   III
2/02  SERIE SPECIALE IN COLLABORAZIONE CON HERMES. Regulatory constraints and cost efficiency of the Italian 
public transit systems: an exploratory stochastic frontier model, by Massimiliano Piacenza, March 
3/02  Aspetti gestionali e analisi dell’efficienza nel settore della distribuzione del gas, by Giovanni Fraquelli and 
Fabrizio Erbetta, March 
4/02  Dinamica e comportamento spaziale del trasferimento tecnologico, by Mario Coccia, April 
5/02  Dimensione organizzativa e performance della ricerca: l’analisi del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, by 
Mario Coccia and Secondo Rolfo, April 
6/02  Analisi di un sistema innovativo regionale e implicazioni di policy nel processo di trasferimento tecnologico, by 
Monica Cariola and Mario Coccia, April 
7/02  Analisi psico-economica di un’organizzazione scientifica e implicazioni di management: l’Istituto Elettrotecnico 
Nazionale “G. Ferraris”, by Mario Coccia and Alessandra Monticone, April 
8/02  Firm Diversification in the European Union. New Insights on Return to Core Business and Relatedness, by 
Laura Rondi and Davide Vannoni, May 
9/02  Le nuove tecnologie di informazione e comunicazione nelle PMI: un’analisi sulla diffusione dei siti internet nel 
distretto di Biella, by Simona Salinari, June 
10/02  La valutazione della soddisfazione di operatori di aziende sanitarie, by Gian Franco Corio, November 
11/02  Analisi del processo innovativo nelle PMI italiane, by Giuseppe Calabrese, Mario Coccia and Secondo Rolfo, 
November 
12/02  Metrics della Performance dei laboratori pubblici di ricerca e comportamento strategico, by Mario Coccia, 
September 
13/02  Technometrics basata sull’impatto economico del cambiamento tecnologico, by Mario Coccia, November 
2001 
1/01  Competitività e divari di efficienza nell'industria italiana, by Giovanni Fraquelli, Piercarlo Frigero and Fulvio 
Sugliano, January 
2/01  Waste water purification in Italy: costs and structure of the technology, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Roberto 
Giandrone, January 
3/01  SERIE SPECIALE IN COLLABORAZIONE CON HERMES. Il trasporto pubblico locale in Italia: variabili esplicative 
dei divari di costo tra le imprese, by Giovanni Fraquelli, Massimiliano Piacenza and Graziano Abrate, February 
4/01  Relatedness, Coherence, and Coherence Dynamics: Empirical Evidence from Italian Manufacturing, by Stefano 
Valvano and Davide Vannoni, February 
5/01  Il nuovo panel Ceris su dati di impresa 1977-1997, by  Luigi Benfratello, Diego Margon, Laura Rondi, 
Alessandro Sembenelli, Davide Vannoni, Silvana Zelli, Maria Zittino, October 
6/01  SMEs and innovation: the role of the industrial policy in Italy, by Giuseppe Calabrese and Secondo Rolfo, May 
7/01  Le martingale: aspetti teorici ed applicativi, by Fabrizio Erbetta and Luca Agnello, September 
8/01  Prime valutazioni qualitative sulle politiche per la R&S in alcune regioni italiane, by Elisa Salvador, October 
9/01  Accords technology transfer-based: théorie et méthodologie d’analyse du processus, by Mario Coccia, October 
10/01  Trasferimento tecnologico: indicatori spaziali, by Mario Coccia, November 
11/01  Does the run-up of privatisation work as an effective incentive mechanism? Preliminary findings from a sample 
of Italian firms, by Fabrizio Erbetta, October 
12/01  SERIE SPECIALE IN COLLABORAZIONE CON HERMES. Costs and Technology of Public Transit Systems in Italy: 
Some Insights to Face Inefficiency, by Giovanni Fraquelli, Massimiliano Piacenza and Graziano Abrate, 
October 
13/01  Le NTBFs a Sophia Antipolis, analisi di un campione di imprese, by Alessandra Ressico, December 
2000 
1/00  Trasferimento tecnologico: analisi spaziale, by Mario Coccia, March 
2/00  Poli produttivi e sviluppo locale: una indagine sulle tecnologie alimentari nel mezzogiorno, by Francesco G. 
Leone, March 
3/00  La mission del top management di aziende sanitarie, by Gian Franco Corio, March 
4/00  La percezione dei fattori di qualità in Istituti di ricerca: una prima elaborazione del caso Piemonte, by Gian 
Franco Corio, March 
5/00  Una metodologia per misurare la performance endogena nelle strutture di R&S, by Mario Coccia, April 
6/00  Soddisfazione, coinvolgimento lavorativo e performance della ricerca, by Mario Coccia, May  
7/00  Foreign Direct Investment and Trade in the EU: Are They Complementary or Substitute in Business Cycles 
Fluctuations?, by Giovanna Segre, April 
8/00  L’attesa della privatizzazione: una minaccia credibile per il manager?, by Giovanni Fraquelli, May 
9/00  Gli effetti occupazionali dell’innovazione. Verifica su un campione di imprese manifatturiere italiane, by 
Marina Di Giacomo, May   IV
10/00  Investment, Cash Flow and Managerial Discretion in State-owned Firms. Evidence Across Soft and Hard 
Budget Constraints, by Elisabetta Bertero and Laura Rondi, June 
11/00  Effetti delle fusioni e acquisizioni: una rassegna critica dell’evidenza empirica, by Luigi Benfratello, June 
12/00  Identità e immagine organizzativa negli Istituti CNR del Piemonte, by Paolo Enria, August 
13/00  Multinational Firms in Italy: Trends in the Manufacturing Sector, by Giovanna Segre, September 
14/00  Italian Corporate Governance, Investment, and Finance, by Robert E. Carpenter and Laura Rondi, October 
15/00  Multinational Strategies and Outward-Processing Trade between Italy and the CEECs: The Case of Textile-
Clothing, by Giovanni Balcet and Giampaolo Vitali, December 
16/00  The Public Transit Systems in Italy: A Critical Analysis of the Regulatory Framework, by Massimiliano 
Piacenza, December 
1999 
1/99  La valutazione delle politiche locali per l’innovazione: il caso dei Centri Servizi in Italia, by Monica Cariola and 
Secondo Rolfo, January 
2/99  Trasferimento tecnologico ed autofinanziamento: il caso degli Istituti Cnr in Piemonte, by Mario Coccia, March 
3/99  Empirical studies of vertical integration: the transaction cost orthodoxy, by Davide Vannoni, March 
4/99  Developing innovation in small-medium suppliers: evidence from the Italian car industry, by Giuseppe 
Calabrese, April  
5/99  Privatization in Italy: an analysis of factors productivity and technical efficiency, by Giovanni Fraquelli and 
Fabrizio Erbetta, March 
6/99  New Technology Based-Firms in Italia: analisi di un campione di imprese triestine, by Anna Maria Gimigliano, 
April 
7/99  Trasferimento tacito della conoscenza: gli Istituti CNR dell’Area di Ricerca di Torino, by Mario Coccia, May 
8/99  Struttura ed evoluzione di un distretto industriale piemontese: la produzione di casalinghi nel Cusio, by 
Alessandra Ressico, June 
9/99  Analisi sistemica della performance nelle strutture di ricerca, by Mario Coccia, September 
10/99  The entry mode choice of EU leading companies (1987-1997), by Giampaolo Vitali, November 
11/99  Esperimenti di trasferimento tecnologico alle piccole e medie imprese nella Regione Piemonte, by Mario Coccia, 
November 
12/99  A mathematical model for performance evaluation in the R&D laboratories: theory and application in Italy, by 
Mario Coccia, November 
13/99  Trasferimento tecnologico: analisi dei fruitori, by Mario Coccia, December 
14/99  Beyond profitability: effects of acquisitions on technical efficiency and productivity in the Italian pasta industry, 
by Luigi Benfratello, December 
15/99  Determinanti ed effetti delle fusioni e acquisizioni: un’analisi sulla base delle notifiche alle autorità antitrust, by 
Luigi Benfratello, December 
1998 
1/98  Alcune riflessioni preliminari sul mercato degli strumenti multimediali, by Paolo Vaglio, January 
2/98  Before and after privatization: a comparison between competitive firms, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Paola Fabbri, 
January 
3/98  Not available 
4/98  Le importazioni come incentivo alla concorrenza: l'evidenza empirica internazionale e il caso del mercato unico 
europeo, by Anna Bottasso, May 
5/98  SEM and the changing structure of EU Manufacturing, 1987-1993, by Stephen Davies, Laura Rondi and 
Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
6/98  The diversified firm: non formal theories versus formal models, by Davide Vannoni, December 
7/98  Managerial discretion and investment decisions of state-owned firms: evidence from a panel of Italian 
companies, by Elisabetta Bertero and Laura Rondi, December 
8/98  La valutazione della R&S in Italia: rassegna delle esperienze del C.N.R. e proposta di un approccio alternativo, 
by Domiziano Boschi, December 
9/98  Multidimensional Performance in Telecommunications, Regulation and Competition: Analysing the European 
Major Players, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
1997 
1/97  Multinationality, diversification  and firm size. An empirical analysis of Europe's leading firms, by Stephen 
Davies, Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, January 
2/97  Qualità totale e organizzazione del lavoro nelle aziende sanitarie, by Gian Franco Corio, January 
3/97  Reorganising the product and process development in Fiat Auto, by Giuseppe Calabrese, February  
4/97  Buyer-supplier best practices in product development: evidence from car industry, by Giuseppe Calabrese, April   V
5/97  L’innovazione nei distretti industriali. Una rassegna ragionata della letteratura, by Elena Ragazzi, April 
6/97  The impact of financing constraints on markups: theory and evidence from Italian firm level data, by Anna 
Bottasso, Marzio Galeotti and Alessandro Sembenelli, April 
7/97  Capacità competitiva e evoluzione strutturale dei settori di specializzazione: il caso delle macchine per 
confezionamento e imballaggio, by Secondo Rolfo, Paolo Vaglio, April 
8/97  Tecnologia e produttività delle aziende elettriche municipalizzate, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Piercarlo Frigero, 
April 
9/97  La normativa nazionale e regionale per l’innovazione e la qualità nelle piccole e medie imprese: leggi, risorse, 
risultati e nuovi strumenti, by Giuseppe Calabrese, June 
10/97  European integration and leading firms’ entry and exit strategies, by Steve Davies, Laura Rondi and Alessandro 
Sembenelli, April 
11/97  Does debt discipline state-owned firms? Evidence from a panel of Italian firms, by Elisabetta Bertero and Laura 
Rondi, July 
12/97  Distretti industriali e innovazione: i limiti dei sistemi tecnologici locali, by Secondo Rolfo and Giampaolo 
Vitali, July 
13/97  Costs, technology and ownership form of natural gas distribution in Italy, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Roberto 
Giandrone, July 
14/97  Costs and structure of technology in the Italian water industry, by Paola Fabbri and Giovanni Fraquelli, July 
15/97  Aspetti e misure della customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction, by Maria Teresa Morana, July 
16/97  La qualità nei servizi pubblici: limiti della normativa UNI EN 29000 nel settore sanitario, by Efisio Ibba, July 
17/97  Investimenti, fattori finanziari e ciclo economico, by Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, rivisto sett. 1998 
18/97  Strategie di crescita esterna delle imprese leader in Europa: risultati preliminari dell'utilizzo del data-base 
Ceris "100 top EU firms' acquisition/divestment database 1987-1993", by Giampaolo Vitali and Marco 
Orecchia, December 
19/97  Struttura e attività dei Centri Servizi all'innovazione: vantaggi e limiti dell'esperienza italiana, by Monica 
Cariola, December 
20/97  Il comportamento ciclico dei margini di profitto in presenza di mercati del capitale meno che perfetti: un'analisi 
empirica su dati di impresa in Italia, by Anna Bottasso, December 
1996 
1/96  Aspetti e misure della produttività. Un'analisi statistica su tre aziende elettriche europee, by Donatella 
Cangialosi, February 
2/96  L'analisi e la valutazione della soddisfazione degli utenti interni: un'applicazione nell'ambito dei servizi sanitari, 
by Maria Teresa Morana, February 
3/96  La funzione di costo nel servizio idrico. Un contributo al dibattito sul metodo normalizzato per la 
determinazione della tariffa del servizio idrico integrato, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Paola Fabbri, February 
4/96  Coerenza d'impresa e diversificazione settoriale: un'applicazione alle società leaders nell'industria 
manifatturiera europea, by Marco Orecchia, February 
5/96  Privatizzazioni: meccanismi di collocamento e assetti proprietari. Il caso STET, by Paola Fabbri, February 
6/96  I nuovi scenari competitivi  nell'industria delle telecomunicazioni: le principali esperienze internazionali, by 
Paola Fabbri, February 
7/96  Accordi, joint-venture e investimenti diretti dell'industria italiana nella CSI: Un'analisi qualitativa, by Chiara 
Monti and Giampaolo Vitali, February 
8/96  Verso la riconversione di settori utilizzatori di amianto.  Risultati di un'indagine sul campo, by Marisa Gerbi 
Sethi, Salvatore Marino  and Maria Zittino, February 
9/96  Innovazione tecnologica e competitività internazionale: quale futuro per i distretti e le economie locali, by 
Secondo Rolfo, March 
10/96  Dati disaggregati e analisi della struttura industriale: la matrice europea delle quote di mercato, by Laura 
Rondi, March 
11/96  Le decisioni di entrata e di uscita: evidenze empiriche sui maggiori gruppi italiani, by Alessandro Sembenelli 
and Davide Vannoni, April 
12/96  Le direttrici della diversificazione nella grande industria italiana, by Davide Vannoni, April 
13/96  R&S cooperativa e non-cooperativa in un duopolio misto con spillovers, by Marco Orecchia, May 
14/96  Unità di studio sulle strategie di crescita esterna delle imprese italiane, by Giampaolo Vitali and Maria Zittino, 
July. Not available 
15/96  Uno strumento di politica per l'innovazione: la prospezione tecnologica, by Secondo Rolfo, September 
16/96  L'introduzione della Qualità Totale in aziende ospedaliere: aspettative ed opinioni del middle management, by 
Gian Franco Corio, September   VI
17/96  Shareholders’ voting power and block transaction premia: an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies, by 
Giovanna Nicodano and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
18/96  La valutazione dell'impatto delle politiche tecnologiche: un'analisi classificatoria e una rassegna di alcune 
esperienze europee, by Domiziano Boschi, November 
19/96  L'industria orafa italiana: lo sviluppo del settore punta sulle esportazioni, by Anna Maria Gaibisso and Elena 
Ragazzi, November 
20/96  La centralità dell'innovazione nell'intervento pubblico nazionale e regionale in Germania, by Secondo Rolfo, 
December 
21/96  Ricerca, innovazione e mercato: la nuova politica del Regno Unito, by Secondo Rolfo, December 
22/96  Politiche per l'innovazione in Francia, by Elena Ragazzi, December 
23/96  La relazione tra struttura finanziaria e decisioni reali delle imprese: una rassegna critica dell'evidenza 
empirica, by Anna Bottasso, December 
1995 
1/95  Form of ownership and financial constraints: panel data evidence on leverage and investment  choices by Italian 
firms, by Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, March 
2/95  Regulation of the electric supply industry in Italy, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Elena Ragazzi, March 
3/95  Restructuring product development and production networks: Fiat Auto, by Giuseppe Calabrese, September 
4/95  Explaining corporate structure: the MD matrix, product differentiation and size of market, by Stephen Davies, 
Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
5/95  Regulation and total productivity performance in electricity: a comparison  between Italy, Germany and France, 
by Giovanni Fraquelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
6/95  Strategie di crescita esterna nel sistema bancario italiano: un'analisi empirica 1987-1994, by Stefano Olivero 
and Giampaolo Vitali, December 
7/95  Panel Ceris su dati di impresa: aspetti metodologici e istruzioni per l'uso, by Diego Margon, Alessandro 
Sembenelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
1994 
1/94  Una politica industriale per gli investimenti esteri in Italia: alcune riflessioni, by Giampaolo Vitali, May 
2/94  Scelte cooperative in attività di ricerca e sviluppo, by Marco Orecchia, May 
3/94  Perché le matrici intersettoriali per misurare l'integrazione verticale?, by Davide Vannoni, July 
4/94  Fiat Auto: A simultaneous engineering experience, by Giuseppe Calabrese, August 
1993 
1/93  Spanish machine tool industry, by Giuseppe Calabrese, November 
2/93  The machine tool industry in Japan, by Giampaolo Vitali, November 
3/93  The UK machine tool industry,  by Alessandro Sembenelli  and Paul Simpson, November 
4/93  The Italian  machine tool industry, by Secondo Rolfo, November 
5/93  Firms' financial and real responses to business cycle shocks and monetary tightening: evidence for large and 









Free copies are distributed on request to Universities, Research Institutes, researchers, students, etc. 
Please, write to: 
MARIA ZITTINO, Working Papers Coordinator 
CERIS-CNR, Via Real Collegio, 30; 10024 Moncalieri (Torino), Italy 
Tel.  +39 011 6824.914;     Fax  +39 011 6824.966;  m.zittino@ceris.cnr.it; http://www.ceris.cnr.it 
 
 
Copyright © 2006  by CNR-Ceris 
All rights reserved. Parts of this paper may be reproduced with the permission of the author(s) and quoting the authors 
and CNR-Ceris 